The influence of population growth on per-worker income in developed economies / BEBR No. 33 by Simon, Julian Lincoln, 1932-

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URbANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/influenceofpopul33simo

Faculty Working Papers
The Influence of Population Growth
on Per-Worker Income in Developed Economies
Julian L. Simon
University of Illinois
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana
-Champaign
November 19, 1971
The Influence of Population Growth
on Per-Worker Income in Developed Economies
Julian L. Simon
University of Illinois
No. 33

THE INFLUENCE OF POPULATION GROWTH
ON PER-WORKER INCOME IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
Julian L. Simon*
INTRODUCTION
There are two contradictory points of view about the effect of
population growth upon per-worker income in rich countries. Classical
analysis using the standard economic concepts of saving, demand, and
the production function suggests that an increment of population reduces
per-worker income once the nation or combination of nations is large
enough so there are no important economies of scale, and given full
employment and high-plateau life expectancies (see, for example, Maithus,
1803; UN, 1953, pp. 27-32, 36-39, and references cited therein; Meade,
1955; Phelps, 1968). But historical examples — the concurrent explosion
in Europe of both population and economic development from 1650 onwards,
and the failure of France to excel economically despite its low birth
rate in the past 100 years — and also contemporary international
cross-sections, suggest that at least in more-developed countries
(MDC's), population growth does not hinder and perhaps helps economic
*I am grateful to Gyani Singh and Israel Luskl for programming
of the model. Mr. Luski also gave me valuable advice in the manipulation
of the model. I also appreciate' useful comments on an earlier draft
by Professors Simon Kuznets and Nathaniel Leff . And I benefited greatly
from the comments of the faculty seminar at Tel Aviv University.
-
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growth (see Sauvy, 1969; Kuznets, 1967; Easterlin, 1967). Growth in
knowledge caused by the larger number of people is the main factor that
has been adduced to explain the discrepancy between the classical
model and the observed reality (Kuznets, 1960).
The aim of this paper is to create a framework within which
the contradiction may be reconciled quantitatively. Knowledge and
related factors are incorporated into the standard analysis so that
the opposing strengths of growth in knowledge and of diminishing returns
may be weighed against each other. Crude estimates are inserted into
iterative simulations to learn the effect on per-worker income of
various patterns of population growth under various conditions. Within
the range of assumed conditions, the effect of a population increase
generally goes from negative to positive within 50 to 100 years. It
must be emphasized, however, that the various models simulated are
intended only to be illustrative and suggestive, and do not purport to
represent either the U.S., or any other single country, or the developed
world as a whole. Also to avoid disappointment, please be warned that
the central finding results from adding a single element — the effect
of populstion size upon productivity — to a simple classical model,
within what seem to the writer to be reasonable ranges of the basic
parameters. The outcome of adding this factor may seem obvious, but I
believe that the elaboration of the models is necessary to make the central
finding seem persuasive as a description of economic and population
growth in the more-developed world.
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The paper may be viewed as an attempt to formalize and quantify*
Kuznets' masterful paper (1960). In the formal approach used here many
of the interesting influences discussed by Kuznets are necessarily left
out; the reader is therefore referred to that paper for greater richness
and a more complex view of the matter. It should be noted, however,
that this paper is not an empirical study. It is, rather, a theoretical
exercise in which the simulation technique is used instead of analytic
methods. This has the disadvantage of less generality than analytic
methods, because the results hold only for the specific sets of parameters
the models are run on, and apply only by analogy to other sets of para-
meters within the ranges of the simulated sets. That is, unlike analytic
methods, no results are proven to hold for all cases consistent with the
basic assumptions. On the other hand, the simulation method has the
advantage of allowing one to theorize about a much richer and more
realistic model than analytical methods allow, and with more specificity.
The context of the paper is near-full employment; when there is
substantial unemployment, population growth is relatively more favorable
because of the positive effect on demand, including the public sector.
The time horizon is sufficiently short so that possible major changes
in the natural-resource situation may be disregarded — perhaps 50
*"...we have no tested, or even approximate, empirical coefficient
with which to weight the various positive and negative aspects of
population growth." (Kuznets, 1960, p. 339)
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or 150 years. Though the terms of reference are to the United States,
it would be most appropriate to conduct this analysis for the developed
world as a whole, because of the scientific and technological inter-
dependence among the MDC's.
The aim here is not to determine whether it is worthwhile for
a society to have more or fewer children. Such a judgment would require
various difficult assumptions such as the following: (a) A rate at which
future consumption utility is to be discounted in the present must be
chosen if a welfare decision is to be made. A very high discount rate
implies that having no children is best, because the children will become
producers only long after they are consumers; and a zero discount rate
makes any meaningful calculation impossible. (b) A welfare decision
requires that one decide which people are to be considered the members
of the community whose welfare is to be maximized. For example, should
one maximize the welfare of only the people alive today, or should one
also include future peoples 1 welfare in the objective function? (c) One
would need to make difficult decisions about what is to be considered
consumption. For example, which parts of a child's education in the home,
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street, and school are to be considered investment, and which are to be
considered consumption by the child, his parents and society?
The purposes of this paper rather, are these: (1) to understand
"in the history of industrial nations the influences of population growth
on income through changes in capital and knowledge; (2) to consider what
"the future course of output per worker might be with higher or lower
birth rates.
The dependent variable is" output (or income) per worker ,* and
not "consumption per capita (or per consumer-equivalent). In the long run
"the two measures are much the same. In the short run an increase in
population through an increase in fertility necessarily implies a drop
In consumption per capita even if output per worker remains the same,
"because the total number of workers remains the same while the number of
people increases. In the household, income is then spread among more
people. And when population grows faster there is greater public
consumption of education and other child- raising services,** which
implies larger taxes and less resources available for private consumption
and saving. But in the long run measures of consumption per capita and
output per worker will give much the same result, and the focus here is
*It is not assumed here that per-capita income is the appropriate
measure of welfare; ^elsewhere I argue that it is not (Simon, 1970). But
per-capita income is one of the arguments in almost everyone's welfare
function.
**The investment aspect of education will be treated later.
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on the long run. Furthermore, lower per-person consumption need not
mean lower total utility . In fact, depending on one's social welfare
function, the same total consumption spread among more people might be
seen as yielding higher total utility.
The first section after this introduction gives the demographic
structures to be analysed. The second section sets forth a simple
classical analysis to estimate the partial effect of a higher birth rate
on income through the capital stOGk, savings, and labor force. The third
section describes a way to estimate the partial effect of a higher birth
rate through the variables not included in the classical model, i.e.,
knowledge, scale effects, and natural resources. In the fourth section
the two partial approaches are brought into numerical relation with each
other to weigh the net effect on per-worker income in a large rich
industrialized country of more or less children being born.
The symbols used are as follows:
A = level of the economy 's productive efficiency as of year t
e = elasticity of labor force with respect to children born
e - elasticity of the saving ratio, s, with respect to number of childrei
~ s
F. » number of females of age i as of year t ...
i» t
H * the stream of increments to productivity caused by an incremen'
to knowledge in year t created by a given increment of people
K = stock of capital in year t
1 «= number of worker-equivalents of age i as of year t
if t
L number of people in the labor force
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M = number of males of age i as of year t
N natural resources available for use in year t
P = total population in year t
R = the effective labor force; the sum of workers weighed by
education
S = ratio of saving to output
w ratio of children 20 and under to adults 21-60
Y = the aggregate output* in year t
I. THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURES
The population and labor-force structures to be compared are as
follows: The comparison base, structure I, has an exogenous 1% growth
in the birth-rate each year, i.e., F. 1.0IF
1 .,
and M = 1.01M. . .
starting in year t «= -60. In this and in all other population structures
infants live until they enter the labor force at age 21, and also through
the end of their labor-force service at age 60, i.e., M- M„, t+2i
=
M/- rt ./-n» and the same for females. The number of males and females ofOU, t+oU
each age are equal in this and in all other structures. (All children
are assumed born on January 1, and up until the end of their first year
the cohort is labeled (1.)). Adults are assumed not to matter economically
after age 60.
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The population in year t=C in structure I is then
« Pt-0 = M60,t=0 + F60,t=0 + M59,t=0 + F59,t= - + Ml,t=0 + Fl,t=0
"
M60,t=0 + F60,t=0
+ X - 01 M60,t=0 + l ' 01 M60,t=0
+ (1 ' 01)2M60,t=0 + (1 ' 01 > 2F60,t=0 + < 1 - 01 > 59M60.t-0
+ (1 ' 01)59F60,t=0-
In structure I in which births increase 1% per year, half the
women are assumed to work. The tabor force at time t=0 is then
60 60
(2) Lt«o
=
ii21 Mi,t=0
+
- 5 i?21 Fk,t=0-
In structure II the population is augmented by a 50% increment
in the birth rate in just a single year, t=l, i.e., M, , = 1.51 M, . «j = < l,t=l l,t*0
1.51 M
1
_. All other cohorts remain the same as in structure I. Hence
for the 40 years from t=21 to t=60 there is in structure II a single cohorc
that is roughly 50% larger than its next-aged cohorts, and the labor force
is larger by that many workers for the 40 year period. This may be seen
in Figure lb, which shows the fine detail from Figure la for the first
thirty years after t=0.
Figures la and lb
In structure III the birth-rate is incremented by 50% over
structure I in year t=l, but unlike structure II, the bulge continues in
each successive year. That is, in structure III, M, ^ .. 1.51 M, n ,J l,t=l l,t=0
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and M, _ = 1.01 M , and M _ = 1.01 M 1 _, and so on. Hence
all cohorts from t=+l onwards are more than 50% bigger in structure III
than in structure I. The resulting labor force may be seen in Figures la
and lb. It is worth noting that after an adjustment period the dependency
ratio, w, is again the same in structure III as in structure I.
In structure IV the birth-rate rises by 2% a year instead of the
1% in structure I, i.e., M*V
t+k
= 1.02 M*
V
. ..
II. THE CAPITAL AND LABOR-FORCE EFFECTS OF HIGHER FERTILITY
Assume that the output of a large developed area such as the
United States or all of the industrialized countries together is a
Cobb-Douglas function such as
(3) \-\ K° Lt-
The Effect Through the Supply of Parents' Labor
Incremental babies will cause some women to be out of the labor
force who would otherwise work. From studies of U.S. census data by
Bowen and Finegan (1969), Cain (1966), and Sweet (1970), together with
the assumption that each woman will have at least one child, an incremental
child is seen to result in a total decrease of .45 of a woman's work
year, spread over the two years after the child is born. On the other
hand, an incremental child causes a total increase in .10 of a man work
year by fathers, spread over 25 years. The calculation for these estimates
is given in Appendix A.
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In the simulation runs in which the labor force is to be adjusted
for the effect of children on the. supply of labor,
60
(4) L
t
" il21 M i,t + - 0025 <Mi,t
+ F
l,t>
+
- 0025 (M
2,t
+ F2,t>
+-"
60
... + .0025 (M
25jt + F25>t ) + .5 iEn F^ - .22 (M^ + F^,
" «
22 (M
2,t
+F
2,t>-
The effect of incremental' children on the parents 1 labor supply
will be shown in the comparisons of- structures II and III to structure I;
in these cases all conditions are the same up to time t=0, and different
thereafter as the numbers of births differ. But there seems to be no
way to compare the labor-force effect of additional children in stable
populations with different rates of growth, i.e., structure IV versus
structure I.
The effect of incremental children on the parents' labor supply
is not important, however, as can be seen in even an unrealistically-high
upper-limit estimate of the effect of incremental children on the economy
through the parents' labor-force. If the birth-rate is a low 25 per
thousand and there avz a low 400 employed workers per thousand, a doubling
in the birth rate would only mean a drop in the labor-force to
(400 = .45 x 25) = 389, or about 3%, using an estimate of .45 worker-
years lost per incremental child. Total output would drop even less,
maybe 2%. Physical saving might then go down by, say (.12 x .02) - .0024
of total output. The cumulative effect on output of such a change would
be very small, and clearly it is thoroughly implausible that the birth
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rate in an MDC might as much as double from any decadal base, say, to
a plateau twice as high.
The Effect Through Changes in Private Saving of Physical Capital
Several kinds of evidence, discussed in Appendix B, are relevant
for an estimate of the effect of number of children on private saving.
These include family cross-sections, cross-sections of nations, and
time-series evidence. One may find support for an estimate higher than
-1.0, or as low as 0, for the elasticity of the proportion of income
saved with respect to a proportional change in family size. Separate
simulation runs were therefore made with elasticities of -1, -.5, and 0,
as follows. The ratio,
20
iil (Fi,t+ Mi,t)
60
ihl (Fi,t + Mi,t)
is computed for each year in each case. For structure I it is .67 for
each year, and is referred to as w. In other structures the saving ratio
for each year is then calculated as
w - w
t
(5) S = S(l + e —K ) where s is the proportion of income saved int c w
structure I, and e„ is the elasticity of saving with respect to children.
The Effects of Schooling
Two aspects of education are relevant. First, more children
mean higher expenditures on education, which may cut into investment on
physical capital as well as reducing consumption. Second, if incremental
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expenditures on schooling are less than proportional to the number of
incremental children and if there are no economies of scale in education,
an increased number of children will cause a lower average quality of
the work force in future years.
Education is treated in several ways. In the basic model,
education is ignored completely, and investment in physical capital is
6% in all demographic structures.* In a second model, the level of
education as measured by expenditures per child per year of school age
is fixed and rising at 1% per year, because the annual increase in
average school-leaving age has been of this general magnitude in the
last half century. In the base year (and also for all other years in
structure I) expenditure on education, S _ , is 6% (Appendix C gives
vthe basis for this estimate) . In all years
In each year after t=0 the expenditure on education is made a function
of the number of children
S
t * ^.t qi=6 + 1i=7,t qi-7'" 1i=20,t qi=20'
where the relationships among the expenditures for various school years,
q
.
, are fixed according to a crude schedule, e.g., grade 1=1, grade 2
1.125 ... grade 9=8... The effective labor represented by a worker
*The corresponding initial capital-output ratio is 3. Runs were
also made with a savings rate of .12 and K/Y ratio of 4, with much the
same results.
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in any year is the square root of the total amount spent on his schooling
during his youth.* And the effective labor force in any year, R , is
the sum of the persons of labor-force age weighted by their effective
labor values
1=60 j=20 ,
where the subscript j refers to the various years in the past when the
cohort received its education. Though the following equations show L
rather than R, the latter should be understood for those models in which
education is explicitly introduced.
In a third model, the level of education is not fixed exogenously.
Rather, the total amount spent on education is made a function of the
dependency ratio weighted by the relative school-year cost in each cohort
i=20 n / i=20 j
L 1=6 i,t ^i / i*6 i,t ni
S
t " i=60 / i=60
i-21 i,t / i-21 i,t
where the Roman superscripts refer to demographic structures. This model
suggests that the standard of education falls if the number of children
rises. Again, effective labor-force, R, is entered into the production
function in place of L where called for by the specific model.
*See Dennison (1969) for relationships between years of schooling
and earnings, the latter a proxy for individual productivity. I do not
think that Gintis' recent work (1971) contradicts this relationship
over time.
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A more refined model would change the proportions over time of
each cohort getting education and working. But such a modification
would not be likely to affect the particular sorts of conclusions this
paper is intended to provide.
The effect on saving of the social spending for education and
other children's services is most unclear. To my knowledge, there is
no basis on which to estimate either the elasticity of spending on
schools, or even harder, the extent to which the incremental expenditures
on schools substitute for other social investment rather than causing
new tax levies. I shall therefore simply assume that the three private
saving elasticities being tried will bracket the elasticity that includes
social as well as individual saving.
The Effect Through the Increments to the Labor Force
Now let us move ahead to the time when the incremental children
enter the work force. If the capital stock does not receive an increment
proportionally as large as the increment to the work force — or,
a fortiori
,
if the capital stock is even smaller than otherwise due to
a reduction in saving — then per-worker output will be lower than
otherwise.*
*If the family and society save enough extra so that average
capital per worker would be the same with or without the increment of
children, as may be the case with the Hutterites, per-worker income would
be the same after the incremental workers entered the work force. But
this must occur at a cost of lower per consumer consumption prior to
the years of labor force entrance.
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The difference in early years between Y , the "base output," and
Y', the output with the incremental people in the work force, may be calculated
as follows:
(6) Y-Y* = AK
a
L
S
- AK
a
L
g
+ ^AL, = &~LL,
from the rule for the Cobb-Douglas function that the marginal productivity
of labor equals average productivity multiplied by the coefficient of
labor (Klein, 1962, p. 94). The difference in per-capita output is then
easy to figure. In the longer run the "classical" effect of the in-
cremental children is given by growth theory. Structures II and III,
which have the same rate of fertility as structure I except for the
initial shocks, converge in per-worker income to structure I after a
period of lower Y/L. Structure IV must have a lower equilibrium rate
of growth in per-worker income because of the higher fertility rate.
The above propositions refer to the model in which the effective labor
force is a function of the number of persons; when education also affects
the effective labor force, things get more complex. And of course these
propositions apply only when the rate of technological change is inde-
pendent of the size of the population; this is not so in the models developed
here.
III. KNOWLEDGE, SCALE, AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The previous section sketched the basic classical approach, which
suggests that people other than the incremental population would be
better off in at least the first 20 or 25 years if the incremental children
were not born. Now we take up the forces that may mitigate or reverse
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the effect: natural resources, economies of scale, and technical
knowledge — or NET for a short-cut acronym.
To disentangle the three NET factors from each other seems hope-
less. Rather they must be treated together as a complex, and to doing
so is a main methodological feature of this paper. To illustrate why
they must be treated together, consider natural resources first. Natural
resources might be thought of as a third factor of production.
(7) -V - A K\BNY
and it would seem reasonable that N is a negative function of output
in previous years, perhaps the sum of previous output
(8) N
t
=
-g(J Y t ).
Equation (8) is consistent with the static physical point of view that
natural resources such as coal and oil must diminish over time. But
the definition of resources by the amount that are "really" in the earth
is not operational and hence meaningless. What is relevant is that the
economically meaningful available resources have mostly not decreased
over time, as Barnett and Morse (1963) have shown. This increase in
available resources is a function of increasing knowledge, e.g., new
ways to prospect for and retrieve oil, new plastic materials to substitute
for metals, and improved forestry techniques. Seen this way, natural
resources are not different from physical capital. We may therefore
think about the stock of available resources at time t as part of the
capital factor, K, in equation (3), and the future course of the stock
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of natural resources will be affected by saving and by increase in
knowledge in the same way as conventionally-defined physical capital.
Considering economies of scale and technological knowledge, now:
The two factors conceptually could be separated. One can imagine an
experiment in which every other person and installation in the United
States would be removed, holding the stock of knowledge constant, to
see the effect upon output per worker. But such an experiment is not
feasible, and the growth of scale^and of knowledge have been so collinear
in the past that it is not possible to separate them statistically.
For this reason, and because of their essential inextricability,* we
must treat them together.**
For purposes of estimation, one may identify the NET complex
with the residual left in production-function studies after the effects
of capital, labor and the amount of education are accounted for. In
the context of the Cobb-Douglas production function, the residual may
be seen as changes in A. The problem about whether the increases in
capital (and labor) should or do reflect improvements due to increased
*Professor Kuznets emphasized this inextricability in conversation.
**Dennison's attempt (1967) to get at the effect of scale is useful
but does not resolve this difficulty, I believe. In passing one might
note that his estimate of the rate of advance of knowledge alone , is
"much smaller than the increases in the population. .
. ,
[which] implies
a declining per capita contribution to knowledge" (1962, p. 237). In
the context of this paper, it should be remembered that such advance in
knowledge is only one of the sources of contribution to the NET complex.
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knowledge is critical here, but we shall merely look the problem in the
face and then pass rapidly on. One source for an estimate of the growth
in per-worker output due to the increase in knowledge and scale,
including the effect of natural resources, is Dennison (1967), who
estimated the effect of elements roughly comparable to NET. For the
period 1950-1962 for the U.S., Dennison estimated yearly growth of .76%
for "advances in knowledge" (which excludes the effect of education on
the labor force), and .30% for "economies of scale" (1967, p. 298), for
a total just over 1%. For Northwest Europe he estimated .76% for "advances
in knowledge," .56% for "changes in the lag in the application of
knowledge, general efficiency, and errors and omissions," and .41% for
economies of scale" (pp. 287 and 300), for a total of something over 1.5%.
Solow's estimate for the U.S. for the 40 years from 1909 to 1949 is about
1.5% per year (1957, p. 316). Solow also adduces, though "not really
comparable," an estimate of .75% per year from 1869-1948 by Valavanis-Vail,
and Schmookler's estimate for 1904-13 to 1929-1938 which (though
including agriculture) was of similar size to Solow's estimate. The
model will be run with estimates of .5%, i.0%, 1.5%, and 2.0%, to bracket
any likely values.
The NET element is introduced as follows. If an increment of
workers increases the work force by —» one would expect that the NET
residual which would otherwise be .01 would henceforth be (.01 + .01A)
each year. But an increase in the knowledge component of NET does not
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result in an instantaneous increase in productivity; rather, the effect
of much knowledge is substantially lagged. The extent of the lag in
the application of knowledge is an important empirical question concerning
which I know of no evidence, though it would seem that the length of the
lag is decreasing. Let us suppose that the present mean of the lag
distribution for the NET complex as a whole, for an average cross-section
of workers, is 5 years. This means that we can date the first increment
to the productivity residual at 5* 'years after the incremental workers enter
the labor force, with an additional increment to productivity in each of
the following 40 years until five years after they retire. In the
context of the model, the increase in A from year to year is proportional
to the size of the labor force. This mechanism is calibrated so that
the labor force at time t=-5 in structure I produces an X increase in
A in year t=0, where X is whichever of .005, .01, .015 or .02 is being
tried in that run. That is
A
t "
A
t-1
(9)
^T^ = bLt-5
where b is chosen so that A , = (1 + X)A _ in Case I. The adjustment
constant b is then used in the other cases. The point to notice here
is that the NET additions, knowledge and economies of scale, from an
increment of workers are cumulative.
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IV. THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE: A NUMERICAL MODEL
Before embarking on discussion of the dynamic model, it may be
.useful to show some static partial computations to illustrate the main
forces operating. Assume that in the year t=l, and only in that year
,
the cohort of workers aged 21 is larger than in base case I, and hence
the work force as a whole is larger than it would otherwise have been.
Assume also that £ = 2/3 and the base yearly Increment due to gains in
knowledge is 1%. If one calculates separately the drop in per-worker
product due to the NET effect as in equation 9, in the year t=5 — the
first year in which this cohort's NET contribution is felt — the down-
ward push from the former effect is 32 times the upward push from the
latter effect. But in year t=6 the drop from the capital effect is
only 16 times the rise from the NET effect, because the incremental
workers have now contributed two NET increments. In the year t=7 the
ratio is 32 to 3. In less than 32 years the two effects would be roughly
equal, and product per worker would be about what it would have been if
the incremental workers had not entered the work force. From then on,
product per worker is higher than it would otherwise have been.
Now let us consider, Instead of this partial calculation, a
dynamic model composed of the relationships described earlier in the paper.
To recapitulate, the equations and the parameter estimates are as follows.
First the production function, equation 3, where 6 = .67 and a = .33.
Next the net investment function, for simplicity a proportion of each
year's income, where c = .06 (.12 in some runs)
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(10) K
t+1
-K
t
-cY
t
.
The model begins in each case with L Q = 1 and K _ = 1. A is set
at 1/3. Separate runs were made with the savings elasticity at -1.0,
-.5, and 0, and both with and without the adjustment for the parents'
labor-force effect.
The full results for many variations with the basic no-education
model are shown in Table 1. Summarized selected results from no-education
and education models are shown in Table 2. The rates of growth from
period to period will not be shown for other than the basic model; these
"absolute" results were quite unrealistic because they were run with
the same Cobb-Douglas exponents and other parameters as were used in
the basic model, and more realistic models would require that these
parameters be different when education is handled differently. But the
relative values among the demographic structures can be meaningful, and
are shown as percentages of the base demographic structure I. Also,
only the runs with the "conservative" (i.e., biased-downward) estimates
of the NET effect will be shown.
TABLES I
1. The most important outcome is that under every set of
conditions, even including all the runs with a base level of AA as low
as .005, structures III and IV with more rapid population growth came to
have higher per-worker income than structure I before the end of the
simulation in year 160. And in every run, structure IV, which reaches

Table 1
Output per Worker. Initial Capital-Output Ratio of 3 and Initial Physical Savings
Rate of .06, Labor Force, Not Adjusted for Parental Effect
Run At„o ec Case 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1.005 1.00 1 .33 .36 .39 .43 .47 .52 .57 .62 .69 .76 .84
1.005 1.00 2 .33 .37 .40 .45 .49 .55 .60 .67 .74 .83 .92
1.005 1.00 3 .33 .37 .40 .41 .45 .49 .56 .65 .75 .87 1.01
1 1.005 1.00 4 .33 .35 .37 .40 .44 .49 .55 .63 .73 .86 1.02
1.010 1.00 1 .33 .38 .44 .50 .57 .66 .76 .88 1.01 1.17 1.35
1.010 1.00 2 .33 .39 .45 .52 .60 .70 .82 .95 l.:10 1.28 1.49
1.010 1.00 3 .33 .38 .44 .48 .55 .64 .77 .96 1.18 1.44 1.76
2 1.010 1.00 4 .33 .37 .42 .48 .56 .66 .79 .96 1.19 1.49 1.88
1.015 1.00 1 .33 .40 .48 .57 .68 .81 .97 1.15 1.37 1.63 1.93
1.015 1.00 2 .33 .41 .49 .59 .72 .87 1.04 1.26 1.50 1.79 2.12
1.015 1.00 3 .33 .40 .48 .55 .66 .81 1.01 1.30 1.66 2.09 2.61
3 1.015 1.00 4 .33 .39 .46 .55 .67 .84 1.05 1.33 1.71 2.21 2.88
1.020 1.00 1 .33 .42 .52 .64 .79 .97 1.19 1.45 1.76 2.12 2.56
1.020 1.00 2 .33 .42 .54 .67 .84 1.04 1.29 1.58 1.93 2.34 2.83
1.020 1.00 3 .33 .42 .52 .62 .77 .97 1.26 1.67 2.18 2.81 3.57
4 1.020 1.00 4 .33 .41 .50 .63 .80 1.02 1.33 1.74 2.28 3.02 4.02
1.005 .50 1 .33 .36 .39 .43 .47 .52 .57 .62 .69 .76 .84
1.005 .50 2 .33 .36 .40 .44 .48 .53 .59 .65 .72 .80 .88
1.005 .50 3 .33 .36 .40 .41 .44 .49 .55 .63 .73 .85 .98
5 1.005 .50 4 .33 .35 .37 .40 .44 .49 .55 .63 .73 .85 1.02
1.010 .50 1 .33 .38 .44 .50 .57 .66 .76 .88 1.01 1.17 1.35
1.010 .50 2 .33 .38 .44 .51 .59 .68 .79 .92 1.06 1.23 1.42
1.010 .50 3 .33 .38 .44 .48 .55 .64 .76 .94 1.15 1.40 1.69
6 1.010 .50 4 .33 .37 .42 .48 .56 .66 .79 .96 1.19 1.48 1.88
1.015 .50 1 .33 .40 .48 .57 .68 .81 .97 1.15 1.37 1.63 1.93
1.015 .50 2 .33 .40 .48 .58 .70 .84 1.01 1.21 1.44 1.71 2.03
1.015 .50 3 .33 .40 .48 .55 .65 .80 .99 1.27 1.61 2.02 2.51
7 1.015 .50 4 .33 .39 .46 .55 .67 .84 1.05 1.33 1.71 2.21 2.88
1.020 .50 1 .33 .42 .52 .64 .79 .97 1.19 1.45 1.76 2.12 2.56
1.020 ..50 2 .33 .42 .53 .66 .82 1.01 1.24 1.52 1.85 2.24 2.70
1.020 .50 3 .33 .42 .52 .62 .76 .96 1.24 1.83 2.11 2.71 3.43
8 1.020 .50 4 .33 .41 .50 .63 .80 1.02 1.33 1.73 2.28 3.02 4.01
1.005 0.00 1 .33 .36 .39 .43 .47 .52 .57 .62 .69 .76 .84
1.005 0.00 2 .33 .36 .39 .43 .47 .52 .57 .63 .69 .76 .85
1.005 0.00 3 .33 .36 .39 .41 .44 .48 .54 .62 .71 .82 .94
9 1.005 0.00 4 .33 .35 .37 .40 .44 .49 .55 .63 .73 .85 1.02
1.010 0.00 1 .33 .38 .44 .50 .57 .66 .76 .88 1.01 1.17 1.35
1.010 0.00 2 .33 .38 .44 .50 .57 .66 .76 .88 1.02 1.18 1.36
1.010 0.00 3 .33 .38 .44 .48 .55 .63 .75 .91 1.11 1.35 1.63
10 1.010 0.00
0.00
4
1
.33
.33
.37
.40
.42
.48
.48
.57
.56
.68
.66
.81
.79
.97
.96
1.15
1.19
1.37
1.48
1.63
1.87
1.015 1.93
1.015 0.00 2 .33 .40 .48 .57 .68 .82 .97 1.16 1.38 1.64 1.94
• 1.015 0.00 3 .33 .40 .48 .55 .65 .79 .97 1.24 1.56 1.94 2.41
11 1.015 0.00 4 .33 .39 .46 .55 .67 .83 1.05 1.33 1.71 2.21 2.88
1.020 0.00 1 .33 .42 .52 .64 .79 .97 1.19 1.45 1.76 2.12 2.56
1.020 0.00 2 .33 .42 .52 .64 .79 .98 1.19 1.46 1.77 2.14 2.57
1.020 0.00 3 .33 .42 .52 .62 .76 .95 1.21 1.58 2.04 2.60 3.28
12 1.020 0.00 4 .33 .41 .50 .63 .80 1.02 1.32 1.73 2.28 3.01 4.00

Table 1
(continued)
At„ e Case 110 120 130 140 150 160 170
1.005 1.00 1 .94 1.05
1.005 1.00 2 1.03 1.15
1.005 1.00 3 1.17 1.36
1.005 1.00 4 1.23 1.51
1.00 1 1.57 1.81
1.00 2 1.72 2.00
1.00 3 2.13 2.56
1.00 4 2.40 3.08
1.00 1 2.28 2.69
1.00 2 2.52 2.98
1.00 3 3.24 3.99
1.00 4 3.78 4.98
1.00 1 3.07 3.68
1.00 2 3.40 4.08
1.00 3 4.49 5.59
1.00 4 5.35 7.15
.50 1 .94 1.05
.50 2 .99 1.10
.50 3 1.13 1.31
.50 4 1.23 1.50
.50 1 1.57 1.81
.50 2 1.65 1.91
.50 3 2.04 2.46
.50 4 2.39 3.08
.50 1 2.28 2.69
.50 2 2.41 2.85
.50 3 3.11 3.81
.50 4 3.77 4.97
.50 1 3.07 3.68
.50 2 3.25 3.89
.50 3 4.30 5.35
.50 4 5.34 7.14
1.005 0.00 1 .94 1.05
1.005 0.00 2 .94 1.05
1.005 0.00 3 1.09 1.25
0.00 4 1.23 1.50
0.00 1 1.57 1.81
0.00 2 1.57 1.82
0.00 3 1.96 2.35
0.00 4 2.39 3.Q7
1.015 0.00 1 2.28 2.69
1.015 0.00 2 2.29 2.71
1.015 0.00 3 2.97 3.63
1.015 0.00 4 3.77 4.96
1.010
1.010
1.010
2 1.010
1.015
1.015
• 1.015
3 1.015
1.020
1.020
1.020
4 1.020
1.005
1.005
1.005
5 1.005
1.010
1.010
1.010
6 1.010
1.015
1.015
1.015
7 1.015
1.020
1.020
1.020
8 1.020
9 1.005
1.010
1.010
1.010
10 i.mn
1.17 1.31 1.47 1.65 1.86
1.29 1.44 1.62 1.83 2.07
1.58 1.82 2.11 2.45 2.83
1.86 2.33 2.95 3.77 4.85
2.10 2.43 2.82 3.27 3.79
2.32 2.69 3.13 3.63 4.21
3.08 3.69 4.40 5.24 6.22
3.99 5.21 6.82 8.99 11.88
3.18 3.75 4.41 5.19 6.10
3.53 4.17 4.91 5.78 6.80
4.87 5.93 7.17 8.64 10.37
6.59 8.74 11.63 15.51 20.72
4.39 5.23 6.22 7.38 8.74
4.89 5.83 6.94 8.23 9.76
6.91 8.49 10.35 12.56 15.17
9.57 12.83 17.21 23.11 31.05
1.17 1.31 1.47 1.65 1.86
1.23 1.38 1.55 1.75 1.97
1.51 1.75 2.02 2.34 2.70
1.86 2.33 2.95 3.76 4.84
2.10 2.43 2.82 3.27 3.79
2.22 2.57 2.98 3.46 4.01
2.95 3.52 4.20 4.99 5.92
3.99 5.20 6.81 8.97 11.86
3.18 3.75 4.41 5.19 6.10
3.36 3.97 4.68 5.50 6.46
4.66 5.65 6.84 8.23 9.87
6.58 8.73 11.81 15.48 20.68
4.39 5.23 6.22 7.38 8.74
4.65 5.55 6.60 7.83 9.27
6.60 8.09 9.86 11.96 14.43
9.56 12.81 17.19 23.08 31.00
1.17 1.31 1.47 1.65 1.86
1.17 1.31 1.47 1.66 1.87
1.45 1.67 1.92 2.22 2.57
1.86 2.33 2.94 3.76 4.83
2.10 2.43 2.82 3.27 3.79
2.11 2.44 2.83 3.27 3.80
2.81 3.35 3.99 4.74 5.61
3. 98
3.18
5.19
3.75
6. 80
4.41 1.8
11.84
6.10
3.19 3.76 4.43 5.21 6.11
4.43 5.37 6.48 7.80 9.34
6.57 8.71 11.59 15.46 20.65
4.39 5.23 6.22 7.38 8.74
4.41 5.25 6.24 7.41 8.77
6,27 7.67 9.34 11.32 13.65
9.54 12.79 17.16 23.04 30.95
1.020 0.00 1 3.07 3.68
1.020 0.00 2 3.09 3.70
1.02Q 0.00~ 3 4.10 5.09
12 1.020 0.00 4 5.34 7.13
WTT:—TtTs only in this model, and only in the high-savings-elasticity runs of this
model, that Structure II differs from Structure I as much as it does. In the model that
is identical except for K/Y - 4 and S - .12, this effect did not occur. The explanation is
a puzzle, but an unimportant one, and does not seem to suggest any systematic error.

Table 2
Summary of Results of Selected Models
In all runs, initial | - 3, initial S*^ - (K x - K Q ) = .06Y t , and elasticity of
saving (e ) * .50. The results shown are per-worker incomes in demographic structures
II-IV as a proportion of — in structure I in the same year.
Year in whic
t«0 t-20 t=40 t=80 t=160 crossing tal
place
Basic NET feedback model, no al- II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.04 1.06
lowance for education initial III 1.0 1.0 .93 1.06 1.42 60-70
AA » 1.005A IV 1.0 .95 .93 1.06 2.28 60-70
Same except initial AA = 1.01A II 1.0 1.0 1.04 1.05 1.06
III 1.0 1.0 .88 1.14 1.37 60
IV 1.0 .96 .98 1.18 2.74 50
No NET feedback, no allowance for II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
. '-nation, AA 1.01 throughout III 1.0 .97 .92 .92 .98
IV 1.0 .84 .87 .82 .78
NET feedback, level of education II 1.0 1.0 .98 1.01 1.0
fixed exogenously and expenditures III 1.0 1.0 .91 1.03 1.35 70-80
on education a function of number IV 1.0 .93 .89 1.0 2.17 80
of children,
S
t
= S
t
+ Sfc?' Y - f(R) '
A - f (L), initial AA * 1.005A
Same except initial AA - 1.01A II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.01 1.00
III 1.0 1.0 .90 1.09 1.46 60-7C
IV 1.0 .97 .90 1.11 2.61 60-70
Same except Y = ffL). A » f (R)
,
II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
initial : ,01A III 1.0 .98 .92 1.04 1.44 70-80
IV 1.0 .93 .92 1.03 2.62 70-80
Same except Y = f(R} A - f (R) TT 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.G1 1.0
initial AA * 1.01 III .98 .93 1.12 1.53 60-70
IV 1.0 .94 .93 1.16 3.18 50-60
NET feedback, level of education II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.01 1.01
an inverse function of dependency III 1.0 .96 .80 .90 1.52 90-100
ratio weighted by relative school- IV 1.0 .89 .82 .84 2.39 100-110
year cost
T «= f (R)
,
A - f(L)
, initial
AA - J.005A
Sarr.': as above except initial II 1.0 1.0 .99 1.01 1.01
1.01A III 1.0 .96 .83 .97 1.78 80-90
IV 1.0 .90 .85 .95 3.42 80-90
S as above except II 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.01 1.00
Y f(L) , A - f(R) , AA = 1.01A III 1.0 .98 .87 1.03 1.74 70-80
IV 1.0 1.04 .89 1.03 4.16 70-80
Sr-r.e as above except II 1.0 .98 .99 1.01 1.01
Y !R) A - f(R), AA = l.OlA III 1.0 .94 .80 .95 2.92 80-90
IV 1.0 .90 .85 1.03 27.9 70-80
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a labor force (in millions, say) of 23,769 in year t=160, has a higher
per-worker income than structure III, which reaches a total labor force
of 7,346 in t=160. (For comparison, the labor force for structure I in
year 160 is 4,913. In all structures the labor force is 1000 in year t=0.)
These results may be compared with the classical growth-theory results
seen in the third block in Table 2.
The mainspring that produces higher per-worker income with higher
population is, of course, the element that makes the rate of change in
the productivity coefficient a function of the number of persons in the
work force. One might argue that this function would in the foreseeable
future be even less than .005, or negative. But there seems to be no
warrant for this argument in conventional studies of growth of national
production using the GNP concept.
The higher the base rate of productivity change, the greater must
be the relative final advantage of the cases of faster population growth,
and the sooner the high-population-growth cases overtake the base case.
And one sees that in run 1 (Table 1) of the no-education nodel which
has the base A equal to 1.0C5 and elasticity of savings of -1.0,
structure III overtakes structure I between periods 60 and 70 and
structure IV does the same. In otherwise-similar run 4 where the base A
is 1.02, structure III overtakes structure I in period 50, and structure
IV overtakes it between period 30 and 40.
2. The effect of incremental children on savings can have sub-
stantial impact on the results in structure IV. In the no-education
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model with S = .12 and K/Y = 4 (results not shown) by year 160, the
comparison of the -1.0 savings elasticity with the zero elasticity shows
such ratios as 3.65/4.42, 8.94/10.94, 15.59/18.93, and 23.36/28.38, all
a bit over 4/5. The -0.5 elasticity produced results roughly in between
the zero elasticity and the -1.0 elasticity. For structure III, however,
the savings effect is very small relative to the differences in Y/L
between structure III and structure I. On the other hand, the effect
is less when S = .06, as may be expected.
3. As seen in the comparison of structure III with structure I
in the runs with and without the labor-force adjustment, the effect
through the parents' labor supply of incremental children after the
first child is quite insignificant, just as preliminary calculations had
suggested they would be. In no case was the relationship between struc-
tures I and III as much as a quarter' of a percent different in year 160
between the runs that were and were not adjusted for the parents' -labor-
force effect. Hence only the runs without the parents' -labor-force
effect are shown.
4. The time required for Y/L in structures III and IV to over-
take Y/L in structure I is generally longer in models where expenditures
on education affect physical saving, even where education positively
influences both R and A . But chis is not invariably true, especially
for structure IV where the labor force always has a younger average age
and hence may have a higher average education than in structure I,
because of the secular growth in education.
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V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
1. Increases in productivity as a result of increased scale
and of knowledge caused by increases in population were added to a
simple classical model of an MDC. Under assumptions about the parameters
that I hope are reasonable, demographic structures with larger rates of
population growth, after initially falling behind in per capita income,
usually overtake structures with' lower rates of population growth in
much less than a century, less than half a century in some cases. This
outcome is a step toward quantifying Kuznets' reasoning about the role
of knowledge in modern economic growth.
2. No distinction has been made between market-induced and
market-autonomous productivity increases. One reason is that the variation
explained by economic incentives that induce innovation is much greater
within a given industry than within a society as a whole; the reward
structure has more influence on whether an inventor works on airplanes
instead of railroads than it does on whether he innovates or does not
innovate at all, it would seem. Another reason is that the incentives
are endogenous, and hence are most easily treated as innards of the black
box that is considered here only in its over-all shape and behavior.
3. Some persons will criticize this formulation of the NET
effect on the grounds that the past rate of increase in knowledge,
economies of scale, and productivity may not continue in the future.
Perhaps. But, even if so, this formulation should add to our understanding
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of the growth of population and per capita income in the past history
of the U.S. and Western Europe. And for at least a short period in the
future it does not seem unreasonable to project the long term trend of
the past. Farther into the future we must bring other arguments to bear
to help us decide whether the growth of productivity will be faster or
slower than in the past. The same criticism may also be made about
natural resources in the future, with the same response.
Some writers have argued that there are already diseconomies of
scale operating, pointing out that traffic jams and other congestion
phenomena increase at a faster rate than the number of people involved.
Whatever the truth about the effects of scale in various separate aspects
of the economy, it seems to me that the overall measure of the NET, the
increase in productivity, is the most meaningful economic measure.
4. The physical capital-output ratio is falling over time in
the U.S., due to the shift to tertiary activities and to the discovery
of better ways to make capital equipment. But on the other hand, the
social cost of schooling will rise in the future. So on balance one
does not know whether the social cost of an incremental labor-force
entrant will fall or rise in the future, relative to his earnings.
5. The difference in effects of population increase in less-
developed and more-developed countries comes out sharply in this analysis.
Productivity per worker does not grow much from year to year in many
LDC's, and hence the residual is small. This implies that an increase
in workers will not increase productivity per worker through an increase
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in knowledge. This conclusion is made even stronger by the fact that
a considerable portion of the increase in knowledge operative in LDC
productivity occurs outside any LDC, and is rather independent of the
size of the LDC work force.
6. The dependent variable in this work has been output per
worker measured in conventional national-income terms . If such amenities
as space and purity of the environment were included in the measurement,
.the results might be different. '(Please note, however, that the effect
of added population on some amenities, such as variety, may be positive.)
Perhaps the most reasonable way to handle the problem would be to deduct
for the hypothesized costs of maintaining a constant level of such
amenities. But this is quite beyond scientific capability at the moment.
There is no reason to believe, however, that such an addition to the
reckoning would change the relative results of population growth, because
there is no reason to believe that at any given point in time there was
or will be a reversal or major change in the trend of the effect of added
population on such matters as space and pollution.

Appendix A
ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF INCREMENTAL CHILDREN ON LABOR
SUPPLIED BY MOTHER AND FATHER
First let us consider the effect of incremental children on the work
supplied outside the home by the mother . The basis is the body of work on
the U.S. Census of I960 by Bowen and Finegan (1969), Cain (1966), and Sweet
(1970). The effect is greater in the years right after the children are born.
$y the time children are 12, there is no observed difference between the labor-
force participation of the incremental mothers and of matching women who did
not have the incremental births - due surely to a trade-off between the labor-
increasing effect of a greater "need" for money, and a labor-reducing effect
of the continued need for care by the child. There may also be a negative
effect from decay of the woman's skills while she is out of the labor force
for one more baby.
To obtain an order-of-magnitude estimate for use here, assume that each
woman will have at least one child in any case, and that each incremental
baby means that the mother will for two years more than otherwise have afchild
under twelve. Hence for two years less than otherwise she will have no child
under 12, the child's age at which labor-force participation ceases to be much
affected by the presence of the child. This means for each incremental child
mother's
two years of /labor force participation at, say, 15% rather than the same two
years at say, Wli> labor-force participation (Sweet, 1968, p. 99). About 2/3
of all women who work are full-time workers , and we shall assume part-time
workers work half-time. Rough calculations then suggest that an incemental
baby results in an over-all loss of 2(.42 - .15) (r) -^5 years of work, or
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.225 of a worker "lost" to the work force in each of the two years after an
incremental baby is born.
Another approach is to figure that women with children under 6 work an
average of 5«6 hours, whereas women with no children under 18 work an average
of 15.5 hours (Sweet, 1968, p. 130). This suggests a loss of a total of 10
hours' work a week for two years, or again 2 x j-r » .45 years of work.
The over-all effect computed here may seem to be small. If this is so
it is largely due to the assumption - reasonable, in my judgment, given the
present incidence and trend of childlessness in the United States - that women
will have at least one child. There is a very big difference in the propensity
to work of women with no and some children, and much less difference among
propensities to work of women with different positive parities. And even
this estimate probably is biased upwards, because some women choose to have
more children on account of an already-made decision not to work rather than
vice versa. If so, it is wrong to interpret the observed difference in labor-
force participation as completely caused by the number of children. Still
another reason why the true net negative effect of children on women's work
is probably less than the estijnate of .45 work years per child is that women
who work often employ substitutes to do their domestic chores.
Now we move from the mother to the father. The positive labor-force
effect of additional children on men, and also perhaps on some groups of women
whose children are 12 or over, receives less emphasis than the negative effect
on women, perhaps because the linkage seems less mechanical and more psychological,
being a shift in preferences concerning work. Yet Bowen and Finegan's work on
labor force participation is shot through with examples of "need" increasing
labor supply, e.g., the strong effect of husband's income on wife's propensity
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to work. Another examp]^f the effect of changed need is Clark's finding
that the greater the war damage a country suffered in World War II, the higher
its rate of saving after the war (1967, p. 263). The fuzziness of the phenomena
that cause a positive effect here should not lead us to downgrade their
importance
.
From the l/lOOO i960 US Census tape I regressed men's hours worked per
week on the number of children men have, holding constant with sub-classification
and multiple regression the mens' education, race, age, occupation and residence
area. For white men an additional -child is associated with approximately .2
additional hours of work per week. If one assumes a 44 hour week and 25 years
of work after the incremental baby is born, then ^- x 25 £J.10 additional work
44
years result per child. This must be an understatement of the effect, however,
because of the bias introduced by the error in the dependent variable. The
error in the male-hours-worked estimate due to the variation from week to week
in hours worked must be considerable, which would cause the regression co-
efficient to be biased downwards.
Other relevant evidence comes from moonlighting. According to Guthrie's
summary of the literature (1966), during the years when men have young children -
between the ages of 24-44 - the rate of moonlighting is relatively higher.
And the incidence of moonlighting among a sample of army men is strongly
affected by the number of children they have. Crude calculations on that
data indicate that an extra child is associated with an increase of about
1/400 in the amount of moonlighting work done each year by the child's father,
or about a tenth of an hour per week on the average. (It is also relevant
that almost three times as many moonlight jobs than regular jobs are self-
employment. Such enterprise must be good for any economy and society.)
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Despite the above additions and qualifications, the model vises the
"conservative" estimate derived from the I960 Census data tape of .2 hours per
week more male labor per additional child for 22 years after the child's birth,
or a total of .10 additional work years per child.
To summarize ,Tthe loss in women's labor is a total of .45 years and
the gain in men's labor is .10 years, (for an additional child/ a difference
of .35 man years. However, the losses through the mothers occur at an earlier
time than do the gains through the fathers. Hence the net loss (if the
estimates are right) is greater than the difference of .35 man-years suggests.
As seen in Equation 4, the parents * -labor-force effect is introduced as
follows. 3y the reasoning given earlier, for each baby born, .225 of a worker
is lost to the work-force for each of two years. Therefore, .225 of a worker
is removed from the model's labor force in the first and second years of each
incremental child's life.* Each father is estimated to offer .25/6 more work
per incremental child, or an increase of .0025 of a worker, and hence that
much work is added in each of 25 years following the incremental child's birth.
The labor force in Case I, year t-0, is assumed to be composed of 66$ men p-:
34$ women.

Appendix B
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF INCREMENTAL CHILDREN
ON FAMILY SAVING AS A PROPORTION OF INCOME
1. Family Budget Surveys .
Budget surveys over a cross-section of families are one source of
evidence. Typically, families are classified by income; within each income
bracket, family size is the independent variable and savings the dependent
variable. Brady (1956, reviewed in. Coale, I960) examined six surveys over
sixty years in the U.S. She concluded that the elasticity of consumption
with respect to family size is 1/6. If one assumes that the marginal
propensity to consume is .88, her finding translates into an elasticity of
-1.2 for saving.*
Eizenga allowed for the effect of age and income with a technique
of "multiple standardization 11 before estimating the effects of family size
on savings from family cross-section data. He estimated that in 1950 savings
would have been about $31 less if the family had 5 children rather than 4, and
about $50 les3 for the average family with 6, 7, 8 or more children than for
the family with k children (1961, p. 90). Relative to per-family income in
that year, these amounts do not seem large, from any point of view. These
estimates may be biased downwards, however, because of the nature of the sample
(the Consumer Expenditure Study of 1950).**
*That is, if a 6$ increase in family size produces a 1$ increase in consumption
from .88 to .89, the reduction in saving is 1/12 or about 8$, and elastici*;,
is 8#/6#.
Consumer surveys must also contain an upward bias because they customarily omit
social security which - like pension-fund saving - is fixed outside the family
independently of the family size.
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There are several reasons why the relationship between family size and
saving observed in budget surveys may not be causal or meaningful for purposes
here:
a) There is a statistical reason to believe that the observed relationship
between family size and saving is not causal. Consider now the relationship
between income and family size. In heterogeneous groupings such as the US or
another country as a whole, the relationship is inverse. And the relationship
between current income and proportion saved is positive (e.g., Friedman,1957)'
Therefore, the simple correlation between family size and proportion saved almost
inevitably is negative.
But within a much more homogeneous group of people, e.g., a group
defined by income, occupation, urbanity oijresidence , and age, the relationship -
/
a much more "partial" one than in the heterogeneous case - between income and
fertility is observed to be positive. Would it not be reasonable, then, to
expect the negative relationship between family size and saving to disappear,
and perhaps a positive (but also non-causally interpretable) correlation also
to appear in such a group? And it certainly seems reasonable that the approp- " itr
context in wldch to think about the effect of children on family size is the
homogeneous group - that is, with all else held equal -because it is rather
unlikely that number of children is an important causal antecedent to changes
in homogeneity of groups with respect to education, age, and so on.
b) If more children cause higher absolute income - as they may after the
first few years after a birth, as the fathers labor effect dominates - the
proportion saved in the budget cross-section is biased upward.
*For the US see Ruggles and Ruggles, I960; Simon, 1969; Willis, I969.
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c) Within cultural groups there may be something analogous to the
"common set of factors residing in the political and social institutions
of a country and in the views governing the behavior of its inhabitants
[that) determines both the economic performance and its demographic patterns"
(Kuznets, 1965. p. 29). To the extent that this is so, one should not interpret
the observed relationship between family size and the savings ratio as a
causal relationship.
d) Budget surveys are unlikely to capture the effect of the birth rate
on business investment, either by, family entrepreneurs or by incorporated
businesses. The increase in total output due to the incremental future
workers raises the expected return on investment, and hence brings some invest-
.ment projections above where the cut-off would otherwise be.
2. Cross-National Comparisons
In a cross-section comparison of countries, Leff (1969) found the
elasticity of saving with respect to dependent children to be - .43 in MDC's,
when controlling for per capita income and other variables. Leff's method
is unexceptionable in itself. But it is well to keep in mind the contradictory
results obtained by the several international multivariate cross-section
studies of a related matter, the connection of income and family size.
Some studies have found a negative coefficient (Russett et al., 1964; Adelman
and Morris, 1966; Rao and Dey, 1968), others a positive coefficient
(Weintraub, 1962; Adelman, 1963; Heer, 1966; Friedlander and Silver, 196?).
Hence any single study of this sort should be treated with caution.
3. Long-run Time-Series Evidence
The notion of an inverse savings-family size relationship receives
no support from the observed sharp decrease in family size in the U.S. in
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the last 100 or 50 years, without secular increase in the proportion of saving
to income. But because so many other things also changed during that period
of time, it would be most unwise to interpret these data as showing that fewer
children produce less saving.
In historical perspective, too, one might expect the relationship of
savings to family size to change as a country becomes more modern. New needs
for saving arise and old substitutes for personal saving disappear. Contemporary
midlle-class families feel a strong need to save for the college educations of
their children, and an increase in offspring might increase saving on this
account; casual support is provided by the behavior of life insurance salesmen,
who descend upon families after marriages and births. Furthermore, the
additional children are not thought of as reducing the parents' need for
retirement saving, as in pre-modern times. These are two strong reasons to
expect the savings-family size relationship to be more positive in richer,
more modern economies than in poorer situations.
k. Other Considerations
The aspect of savings behavior in connection with population which has
caught the interest of most theorists (e.g., Cassell, 1932 /Phelps, 1969;
Kuznets, I960; Meade, 1955; Kodigliani, 1965; and Phelps, 1969) has been the
life-cycle effect. If a population's earners are relatively young, on the
average they will save more than an older population because saving takes place
earlier in life than does dissaving. But one should not interpret this
phenomennn as suggesting that an increase in fertility will increase saving,
because this comparison omits the possible effect of the pre-labor-force years
on saving behavior. At the level of aggregation used in growth theory it
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would be extremely difficult to relate saving to the effect of an incremental
birth. Furthermore, this sort of analysis deals in proportions rather than
in total savings, which are of interest here. Hence I think this life-cycle
*
aggregate analysis is not fruitful here.
An increase in family size may actually increase total saving in some
cases. An example: The Huttsrites of North America who live communally in
colonies "do not believe in practicing birth control, and so they continue to
increase and thus to create -&he need for additional colony sites. The colonies
need more and jnore cash in order
-to buy more and more land. This reduces the
amount of cash available for other things. . .Young colonies starting out, or any
colony unable to realize the levels of productivity needed for saving, will be
helped by others" (Bennett, 196?, pp. I6VI65).
In general the theory of consumption and savings is most complex and
unsettled at present. One cannot say with much certainty what will be the
effect of an increase in income of any sort (e.g., short-run, long-run, windfall)
on saving and consumption. And in particular the relationship of family size
to saving must be even more complex and unsettled than consumption theory in
general.
For the same reason, Clark's finding across a sample of countries of no
relationship between population growth and the savings ratio, holding per
capita income constant (196?, p. 268) is not helpful for our purposes here.

Appendix C
ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF INCREMENTAL CHILDREN ON
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
Schooling is the orly social expenditure considered here. The
bases for the estimate of the effect of children on public schooling costs
are as follows: (a) Expenditure on education is 4.6$ of US national
income (Harbison and Myers, 1969 t p. 41); (b) A quarter of the population
is in school, 18.^ of the population being in the 5-14 age group (ibid);
(c) In 1968, $623 per year was spent by public schools per student year
(Statistical Abstract. 1969 . p. 102); (d) $6,856 average year-round male
earnings in 1966 (Statistical Abstract. 1969 . p. 233). This estimate
excludes foregone earnings, on-the-job training costs, etc.; (e) A high-side
inclusive estimate of US education plus training costs is 12.9$ of adjusted
GNP, by Machlup (Harbison and Myers, 1964, p. 28n).
How much of children's education expenditures should be considered as
consumption is a matter not considered here.
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